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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICKY TARSHA,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45494
Ada County Case No.
CR01-2017-273

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Tarsha failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon the jury’s verdict finding
him guilty of possession of methamphetamine, or by relinquishing jurisdiction?

Tarsha Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A jury found Tarsha guilty of possession of methamphetamine and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
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pp.40-41, 100, 123-26. 1) Tarsha filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.127-30.) Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished
jurisdiction. (Supp. R., pp.148-49.)
Tarsha asserts his sentence is excessive in light of the nature of the offense, family
support, and his substance abuse issues. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.) The record supports the
sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where

Tarsha was also convicted and sentenced for misdemeanor possession of Lorazepam. (R.,
pp.40-41, 100, 123-26.) That conviction and sentence are not challenged on appeal.
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reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for possession of methamphetamine is seven years. I.C. §
37-2732(c)(1). The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years
fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.123-26.) The nature of the offense and
Tarsha’s actions prior to sentencing demonstrate that the sentence imposed was not an abuse of
discretion.
In this case, Tarsha was a passenger in his brother’s vehicle when his brother was pulled
over for failing to use his right turn signal. (PSI, p.3. 2) When Tarsha was identified, it was
confirmed by dispatch that he had a misdemeanor probation violation warrant out of Valley
County. (PSI, p.3.) Tarsha was subsequently searched, and the officer found two small Ziploc
baggies that contained methamphetamine and Lorazepam. (PSI, p.3.)
Tarsha “avoided the presentence investigation process” because he was “‘afraid to face
the consequences.’” (PSI, p. 7.) He did not appear for his sentencing hearing. (R., p. 101.) He
stated he went to court, but left before the hearing because “he was ‘high’ so he got scared,
walked out, and went home where he got ‘high’ again.” (PSI, p.7.) He claims he turned himself
in “approximately three days later” (PSI, p.7), but the record shows he was not back in custody
for a week (R., p. 103). Tarsha’s excuse for his conduct was that uncle passed away in February
(five months previously) and Tarsha claims that event “sent [him] off the deep end.” (PSI, p.7.)

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Tarsha 45494
psi.pdf.”
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Tarsha’s behavior did not indicate a high likelihood that probation or other rehabilitative efforts
would be successful.
While this is Tarsha’s first felony conviction, he has previously been convicted of nine
misdemeanor crimes, and at the time of the offense, was on unsupervised probation in Valley
County for DUI and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent because he “‘left a bar
drunk and stole a UPS truck.’” (PSI, pp.4-7.) Additionally, while housed at the Ada County Jail
prior to sentencing Tarsha had several issues regarding confrontations with other inmates,
swearing and arguing with staff, and flushing wrappers down the toilet. (PSI, pp.116-18.)
At sentencing, the district court set forth its reasons for imposing Tarsha’s sentence and
stated, “I think, realistically, we are not going to be able to hang on to you enough to do anything
practical with that serious addiction unless we began it in a structured setting.” (10/2/17 Tr.,
p.12, Ls.20-24.) The state submits that Tarsha has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for
reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which
the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (10/2/17 Tr., p.11, L.25 – p.14, L.3 (Appendix A).)
Tarsha next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction because he was not able to begin programming and was never assigned a permanent
case manager due to “an altercation with another inmate.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) Tarsha
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The
decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the
defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241,
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248 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v.
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205–06, 786 P.2d 594, 596–97 (Ct.App.1990)). A court's decision to
relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under
I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013); Hansen, 154
Idaho at 889, 303 P.3d at 248 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292
(2001)).
Tarsha has demonstrated through his conduct that he is an unacceptable candidate either
for community supervision or for placement in the rider program.

Upon arrival to the CAPP

rider facility, Tarsha was informed that the lead case manager would handle any questions until
he was assigned a permanent case manager at orientation. (PSI, p.137.) Four days later, Tarsha
was placed on restrictive housing because he was involved in inappropriate behavior while
attending a recovery service. (PSI, pp.131, 133, 137.) Regarding the inappropriate behavior,
CAPP rider staff reported that Tarsha flipped off another inmate and yelled, “fuck you, you punk
fucking bitch,” and continued to harass the inmate until he was removed by security. (PSI,
p.133.) When asked about what happened, Tarsha became argumentative and was placed in
restrictive housing, but he subsequently admitted to the allegations in the DOR, was placed on a
behavior contract, assigned to Case Manager Taylor, and allowed to return to the general
population when his detention time ended. (PSI, pp.133, 136.) About two weeks later, Tarsha
was involved in a physical altercation with another inmate. (PSI, p.133.) Five inmates stated
that Tarsha was verbally aggressive towards another inmate, and three of the five made
statements confirming they saw Tarsha push the other inmate. (PSI, p.133.) The other inmate
retaliated by punching Tarsha, and a secondary fight occurred because of this incident. (PSI,
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p.134.) When questioned by staff about the incident, Tarsha admitted that he may have pushed
another inmate. (PSI, p.133.) In recommending relinquishment, CAPP rider staff stated, “Mr.
Tarsha’s inability to act appropriately in the unit and his tendency to react in the extreme makes
him an unsuitable candidate for return to the community.” (PSI, p.134.)
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction was appropriate in light of Tarsha’s
horrendous behavior during his short time on retained jurisdiction. Tarsha clearly demonstrated
that he was neither a suitable candidate for the rider program or for community supervision, in
light of his incessant violence toward others and refusal to comply with rules. Given any
reasonable view of the facts, Tarsha has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Tarsha’s conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.

DATED this 31st day of May, 2018.

__/s/_Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of May, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_ Kenneth K. Jorgensen __________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A
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1

to it and gets the programming and counseling and

1

2

addresses his mental health issues, there is no

2

3

reason he can't be successful in the community.

3

you don't want to continue to go in this

4

4

5

But really, it's up t o him at this point, and I
think he is asking for the opportunity to prove

direct ion, but just based upon your performance,
pretrial and postt ria l, I don't t hink that it is

6

himself t o t he Court.

6

likely that you would get the treatment t hat you

7

need outside of the structured setting to start

8

with.

5

He's said in the past that he thinks

7
8

probation will be a good thing for him to help get

9

some of the programming and focus on it and really

10
11

12
13

keep tabs on any drug use or any drug issues.
It's something that he thinks that he needs, and
so we are asking the Court to give him that
opportunity.

14

THE COURT: Okay. Any comments, Mr. Tarsha?
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I would just

15

be addressed. It's not acceptable for you to
continue to go in this direction. It sounds like

9

So I'm going to impose on Count 1 a

10

11

sentence of 2 years fixed, followed by 5 years
indeterminate for a 7-year sentence. I'll retain

12

jurisdiction. On Count 2, I'm imposing 60 days

13

jail with credit for time served concurrent, and

14

no costs related to Count 2 .
But as to the proposed restitution,

15

16

like to say, you know, I know I have a few things

16

we'll talk about that after you get back from the

17

against me, but I have a lot of people who look up

17

18

to me. I have a fami ly out there who cares about

18

retained jurisdiction. I think you need
treatment. I think if you are going to be

19

me, th at I care about. And I don't want t o spend
my life in jail. That's it.

19

successful, you need to start treatment. I need

20

20

to have some confidence that you would work at it

21

THE COURT: Is there a legal cause why we

21

and tha t you would address it.

22

should not proceed?

22

And I think, frankly, you lack some

23
24

MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor.

23

fundamental life skills. And if you had those

MR. MARX: No, Your Honor.

24

life skills, you would do a better job. You would

25

THE COURT: Well, I think not wanting to

25

be a more productive member of society and give

12

14

1

spend your life in jail is a sensible t hing to

2

3

think. This isn't a positive direction to go in.
It's clear that while you didn't make the

4

experience any better, to say the least, it

4

5

doesn't look like it was a particularly productive
experience for you.

5

7

8

Now, t he situation in this case is you
were convicted after a jury trial. The facts are

9

pretty straightforward. The drugs were found in

9

6

7

1
2

you a chance to get on your feet and work in a
little better direction. You do have 42 days in

3

which to appeal.

6

8

10

your pocket. You had juvenile and adult record of

10

11

11

12

concern, but -- and I note that you have a very,
very serious addiction. Methamphetamine, IV

13

heroin use, and a habit tha t can cost as much as a

13

14

hundred dollars a day, even though t he legitimate

14

15

income t hat you have falls far short of the
ability to support such a habit.

16

16

12

15

According t o t he presentence
interviewer, you were a no-show initially. And

17

18
19

then when you did show up, you were under the

19

20

influence. I think your addiction is serious. I
think, real istically, we are not going to be able

20

to hang on to you enough to do anything practical
w it h that serious addiction unless we began it in
a structured setting .

22

17

21
22

23
24
25

5 of 6 sheets

(Proceedings concluded at 3:25 p.m.)

I think you need treatment. It has to

18

21

23
24
25
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